20 August, 2009, 16:09
The President of Belarus wants to strengthen law-enforcement agencies before the 2010 presidential campaign.
Aleksandr Lukashenko ordered his administration to draft legislation that would create revolutionary changes in the country’s laws on special investigations. Whereas earlier these could have been ordered exclusively on the authorization of a prosecutor or the Prosecutor General’s Office, the President wants to grant such rights to the Minister of Internal Affairs and the heads of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee.
Many Belarusian experts say this legal innovation could open the door to human rights abuses. A member of the Belarusian Helsinki Committee Garry Pogonyaylo says that in case such changes are adopted the authorities will be able to launch campaigns against dissidents on a whim. At the same time the top law enforcement leaders in Belarus have expressed their full support for these measures.
Aleksandr Lukashenko views this legislation as a means of satisfying the requirements of both legality and operational efficiency. The Belarussian President recently criticized the work of prosecutors’ offices throughout the country at a meeting with these officials. The President accused Belarussian prosecutors of creating stifling bureaucracy which led to lack of operational effectiveness in special investigations and law enforcement across the country. So the president’s proposition at first glance looks like a logical step towards addressing those problems.
Lukashenko’s critics, however, believe that nepotism is behind the prosecutor shakeup. What arouses suspicion is that Alexander Lukashenko’s oldest son Viktor is going to benefit from the planned changes in Belarusian legislation on special investigation activities. At least one of the three functionaries that will be given the powers to authorize special investigations is widely known to be a close associate of the President’s son – Vadim Zaitsev, the head of the Belarusian KGB. Since the KGB remains powerful in Belarus one can say that Viktor Lukashenko may be assuming leadership over a special service of his own – no less powerful than the Presidential Security Service.
Yet the State Prosecutor’s office will not give up its powers and special status so easily. At a board sitting held on August 19, the agency decided to fight back. It issued a statement blaming operatives of KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Financial Investigations Department of the State Control Committee for “multiple infringements of citizens’ rights and explicit falsification of criminal cases.” The Prosecutor-General’s office carried out an assessment of activities of the named agencies and upon getting results decided to put their activities “under strict control”.
It is obvious that there is more in the initiatives of Aleksandr Lukashenko than just succession intrigues behind the scenes. The shakeup of law enforcement agencies is being made in anticipation of two major events. The first is the planned privatization of state enterprises dictated by International Monetary Fund functionaries as a condition for further international loans to prop up the sagging Belarusian economy. Facing this perspective, the president needs a reliable system of checks and balances to prevent any single enforcement agency from monopolizing regulative power during this process. That is why at a meeting with the enforcement institutions on August 8, he also made a proposal of creating the Investigative Committee which would independently carry out investigations for the respective agencies. The head of such a committee could be subordinated directly to the President, thus providing him with the means to intervene if any one agency assumes too much power.
Another major oncoming event is the presidential election scheduled for late 2010 or early 2011. Facing the deteriorating economic situation and falling public support, together with growing pressure from both the West and Russia, Aleksandr Lukashenko clearly understands that keeping the situation in 2010–2011 under his control might require harsh measures. And it is likely that in such situation the Belarusian president will choose maintaining control over the country to Western recognition of the elections as democratic and legitimate.
Consolidating law enforcement into the hands of the most active and loyal Lukashenko functionaries is part of an election campaign which has already begun. On August 18, the Belarusian government did not renew its contract with the Bell Pottinger Group – a British PR company that coordinated the Belarusian–Western rapprochement of 2008–2009. That company’s director Timothy Bell – a close associate of the exiled Russian tycoon Boris Berezovsky who is also said to be close to Belarusian president – refused to comment on the news. But experts agree that it was justified for the Belarusian side to get rid of all outsiders on the eve of an election campaign that would probably involve massive voter rigging and other undemocratic practices.
It seems we can expect another crackdown by the regime in Belarus in the nearest future. And in the wake of this the enforcement agencies are waging a war for the right to become the top defenders of the State. But it is unlikely that Aleksandr Lukashenko – a very skilled and cautious politician – will allow any single agency to dominate the game.
Darya Sologub for RT
суббота, 22 августа 2009 г.
пятница, 24 июля 2009 г.
Belarus highly recommends caution
24 July, 2009, 00:18
Belarusian authorities have advised their citizens to remember Georgia’s laws while visiting Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Does it mean Minsk will not recognize the independence of the two republics?
In Russia the statement was immediately taken as a sign that Belarus still regards Abkhazia and South Ossetia as integral parts of Georgia, and the news was made a front-page story in the media. The issue was taken up by the country’s deputy foreign affairs minister Grigory Karasin, who called his Belarusian colleagues’ statement “odd.” If Georgia’s laws “must be taken into account,” then Belarus believes they are in force on the territory of the two Caucasian republics, which means that for Minsk those territories are still subordinate to the government in Tbilisi.
On the one hand, as Belarus has not recognized the independence of the two republics, it can freely stick to such views. But on the other hand, there is still strong confidence in Moscow that sooner or later, as Abkhazian President Sergey Bagapsh said recently, that Belarus will make a positive decision and all will be settled. However, the issue of recognition of the two republics is yet to be put on the Belarusian parliament’s agenda, and the recent hurdles between Moscow and Minsk show that a diplomatic escalation is quite possible.
So, the main problem seen by Moscow in this statement is whether it shows Belarus’ unwillingness to recognize the two young Caucasian states. The answer, however, is far from political games and allusions.
Here is the message from the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
“Georgia’s legislation introduces restrictions on movement of foreign citizens on the territories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the adjacent territorial waters. Entry of foreign citizens to Abkhazia and South Ossetia are allowed only through Zugdidsky and Goriysky regions of Georgia. Entering Abkhazia and South Ossetia from any other directions without special permission from Georgia’s authorities is prohibited and punished according to Georgia’s Criminal Code. We strongly recommend that our citizens take into account the mentioned provisions of Georgian legislation while planning their trips to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”
And here is the story behind the statement.
About two weeks ago there were incidents with Belarusian citizens who were arrested in Georgia for illegally staying on the territory of an “occupied” Georgia’s “autonomy” (meaning Abkhazia). A young woman and later a man were detained in Tbilisi. The reason for the arrests was that they had previously entered Abkhazian territory, in violation of Georgia’s laws, from the Russian Federation. The woman was put into prison and the man, who had come to Abkhazia for just three days to visit his father’s grave, was fined $1,220. Neither received the maximum sentence: Georgia’s Criminal Code provides 3-5 years in prison or a fine of $3,000-$5,000 for such an offence.
The Belarusian Foreign Affairs Ministry was silent about the two citizens’ adventures in Georgia until the question was raised by a newspaper in Minsk outraged at Belarus’ lack of action to help its citizen allegedly imprisoned since May. The much discussed official statement, therefore, was just a reply to a media inquiry.
“There was an idle sensation in the Russian media,” explains Belarusian political analyst Yury Shevtsov. “Belarus’ statement does not have any significant political meaning. It is just an explanation for Belarusian citizens that if you are going to Georgia you have to remember that in case your passport has a note about crossing the border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Russia’s side, you will be subjected to Georgia’s law and can even find yourself in prison. By the way, it is the same for Russian citizens and for citizens of any other country of the world.”
So it is not with Belarus that Russia has problems in this situation. We all must check our passports before going to Georgia and take the positive side: Belarus is not against recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But whether it is for recognition, nobody knows.
Darya Sologub for RT
Belarusian authorities have advised their citizens to remember Georgia’s laws while visiting Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Does it mean Minsk will not recognize the independence of the two republics?
In Russia the statement was immediately taken as a sign that Belarus still regards Abkhazia and South Ossetia as integral parts of Georgia, and the news was made a front-page story in the media. The issue was taken up by the country’s deputy foreign affairs minister Grigory Karasin, who called his Belarusian colleagues’ statement “odd.” If Georgia’s laws “must be taken into account,” then Belarus believes they are in force on the territory of the two Caucasian republics, which means that for Minsk those territories are still subordinate to the government in Tbilisi.
On the one hand, as Belarus has not recognized the independence of the two republics, it can freely stick to such views. But on the other hand, there is still strong confidence in Moscow that sooner or later, as Abkhazian President Sergey Bagapsh said recently, that Belarus will make a positive decision and all will be settled. However, the issue of recognition of the two republics is yet to be put on the Belarusian parliament’s agenda, and the recent hurdles between Moscow and Minsk show that a diplomatic escalation is quite possible.
So, the main problem seen by Moscow in this statement is whether it shows Belarus’ unwillingness to recognize the two young Caucasian states. The answer, however, is far from political games and allusions.
Here is the message from the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
“Georgia’s legislation introduces restrictions on movement of foreign citizens on the territories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the adjacent territorial waters. Entry of foreign citizens to Abkhazia and South Ossetia are allowed only through Zugdidsky and Goriysky regions of Georgia. Entering Abkhazia and South Ossetia from any other directions without special permission from Georgia’s authorities is prohibited and punished according to Georgia’s Criminal Code. We strongly recommend that our citizens take into account the mentioned provisions of Georgian legislation while planning their trips to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”
And here is the story behind the statement.
About two weeks ago there were incidents with Belarusian citizens who were arrested in Georgia for illegally staying on the territory of an “occupied” Georgia’s “autonomy” (meaning Abkhazia). A young woman and later a man were detained in Tbilisi. The reason for the arrests was that they had previously entered Abkhazian territory, in violation of Georgia’s laws, from the Russian Federation. The woman was put into prison and the man, who had come to Abkhazia for just three days to visit his father’s grave, was fined $1,220. Neither received the maximum sentence: Georgia’s Criminal Code provides 3-5 years in prison or a fine of $3,000-$5,000 for such an offence.
The Belarusian Foreign Affairs Ministry was silent about the two citizens’ adventures in Georgia until the question was raised by a newspaper in Minsk outraged at Belarus’ lack of action to help its citizen allegedly imprisoned since May. The much discussed official statement, therefore, was just a reply to a media inquiry.
“There was an idle sensation in the Russian media,” explains Belarusian political analyst Yury Shevtsov. “Belarus’ statement does not have any significant political meaning. It is just an explanation for Belarusian citizens that if you are going to Georgia you have to remember that in case your passport has a note about crossing the border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Russia’s side, you will be subjected to Georgia’s law and can even find yourself in prison. By the way, it is the same for Russian citizens and for citizens of any other country of the world.”
So it is not with Belarus that Russia has problems in this situation. We all must check our passports before going to Georgia and take the positive side: Belarus is not against recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But whether it is for recognition, nobody knows.
Darya Sologub for RT
понедельник, 20 июля 2009 г.
Belarus to become post-Soviet Las Vegas
20 July, 2009, 13:21
Russia’s gambling business is moving from Moscow to Minsk. The former Moscow casino Shangri La is opening its brand-new premises in Belarus, as the first to be licensed by the Belarusian Ministry of sport and tourism.
According to Russia’s law on the state regulation of gambling, which was passed three years ago, all casinos should have moved their businesses from cities to four special gambling zones in the country’s Krasnodar, Altay, Kaliningrad and Primorsky Regions by July 1, 2009. The owners of the business vigorously opposed the very idea, and up to the last days there had been rumors that the enactment of the law would be postponed or cancelled. Those hopes seemed quite reasonable, as the gambling business was providing more than $2 billion for Russia’s budget. It also formed a substantial share of some local budgets, especially in such big cities as Moscow and St Petersburg, and nothing was supposed to substitute for those lost earnings.
Moreover, after three years, there is still nowhere to move the one-arm bandits to: not one of the four planned “gambling zones” is ready to receive clients. In the Krasnodar region, there is some infrastructure, but no buildings. In the other three – no infrastructure and not even any approved plans for the construction of the “zones”. By June, the Kaliningrad region had only just issued a tender for leasing the land for the gambling centers.
However, there was no indulgence from Russia’s government and, from July 1, gambling business all over Russia became illegal. Some casinos have found a way out by changing labels – they transformed into restaurants, sporting poker clubs and internet-cafés (with an opportunity to play in internet-casinos, of course). Others have begun to look for better places outside Russia. And it seems that some glances settled upon Belarus.
With open arms
Unlike Russia and Ukraine, which also banned gambling on its territory two months ago, Belarus has quite positive feelings towards this kind of business. The representatives of the Belarusian Ministry of sport and tourism, which is responsible for regulating the gambling industry, say there are no plans to make gambling taboo in Belarus. On the contrary, there is interest in creating big casinos.
At the moment, there are more than 8,000 casinos and gambling halls in this small country, which borders both Russia and Ukraine. However, they are for the most part minor enterprises. Foreign capital share in this business is only 10 per cent, and Belarusian authorities clearly do not mind raising this share, as in this case gambling would become a more substantial source of income for the country’s budget. So far, the state is getting just over $13 million annually, and it will certainly be glad to increase this sum (Moscow alone used to get some $120 million annually from the gambling business).
Thus, Belarus will greatly appreciate Russia’s gambling industry (as well as the Ukrainian) moving to its territory. According to Vasily Korzun from the Belarusian Ministry of Sport and Tourism, Belarus is interested in attracting big players to the gambling sector, and it would be glad if Russia’s assets come to the country.
And it seems that Belarus has even been preparing to welcome Russian business. At the moment, President Aleksandr Lukashenko is ready to sign a decree “on some measures for improving the procedure for carrying out activities in the sphere of the gambling business”. According to Lukashenko, this decree is to make gambling laws in Belarus “the best in the world”. Rumors has it that the new laws will open up a wide door for Russian investment into Belarus. Belarusian authorities expect that the Russian gambling business will decide against spending the estimated $10-12 billion to develop the four ‘gambling zones’, as it is too much money in a time of economic crisis, and would rather create the fifth ‘zone’ in Belarus. The country has good infrastructure, and importantly, it is closer to Moscow than the Kaliningrad region.
Moreover, there are plans to build a large gambling and entertainment complex near Minsk Airport, so that the clients will be able to go to the casino right after touching down. The draft document on this issue is now at the Belarusian Ministry Council for approval. The complex is to be situated in a duty-free zone, and a citizen of any state will be able to stay there for 72 hours.
Adaptation
However, there are rumors that only big players will be able to play by the new rules, which means that hard times will come for the Belarusian gambling business, most of which is represented by small companies. Some in the Belarusian media even claim to have seen the draft presidential decree, which, they say, raises the necessary authorized funds to heights unreachable for many Belarusian companies – 50,000 euros for casinos and gambling halls. This sum should be deposited in a bank to guarantee awards to the winners. At the moment, the required authorized fund is the same for gambling and all other companies in the country (around $1000). Another new rule is that all playing machines should have a return rate of 90%. There are no machines of such quality in Belarus at the moment (usually the rate is 80-85%, like in most countries of the world), while in Russia that rule was introduced several years before.
And these are not the only reasons why Belarusian gambling investors might oppose the government plans. Specialists underline that the Russian entertainment monsters would fight savagely for the Minsk market – a battle not likely to be won by Belarusian companies. So in a year or two, the whole industry would be concentrated, obviously, out of Belarusian hands. Besides this, the new rules would break up many local gambling businesses in the country’s small cities, which are the basis of many of the regional elite’s well-being.
On the other hand, there are optimists in Belarus who say that the increased flow of Russian gamblers will outstrip the costs of increased competition. All in all, specialists say it will take Belarusian companies around 2 years to adapt to the new rules, if they are accepted. But for many local businessmen, being a manager in a big Russian company is not much worse than having a business of their own, which means constant struggles with red tape. That is why it may well turn out that, together with the government, they just wait until the Russian businessmen pull all the chestnuts out of the fire for them.
Darya Sologub for RT
Russia’s gambling business is moving from Moscow to Minsk. The former Moscow casino Shangri La is opening its brand-new premises in Belarus, as the first to be licensed by the Belarusian Ministry of sport and tourism.
According to Russia’s law on the state regulation of gambling, which was passed three years ago, all casinos should have moved their businesses from cities to four special gambling zones in the country’s Krasnodar, Altay, Kaliningrad and Primorsky Regions by July 1, 2009. The owners of the business vigorously opposed the very idea, and up to the last days there had been rumors that the enactment of the law would be postponed or cancelled. Those hopes seemed quite reasonable, as the gambling business was providing more than $2 billion for Russia’s budget. It also formed a substantial share of some local budgets, especially in such big cities as Moscow and St Petersburg, and nothing was supposed to substitute for those lost earnings.
Moreover, after three years, there is still nowhere to move the one-arm bandits to: not one of the four planned “gambling zones” is ready to receive clients. In the Krasnodar region, there is some infrastructure, but no buildings. In the other three – no infrastructure and not even any approved plans for the construction of the “zones”. By June, the Kaliningrad region had only just issued a tender for leasing the land for the gambling centers.
However, there was no indulgence from Russia’s government and, from July 1, gambling business all over Russia became illegal. Some casinos have found a way out by changing labels – they transformed into restaurants, sporting poker clubs and internet-cafés (with an opportunity to play in internet-casinos, of course). Others have begun to look for better places outside Russia. And it seems that some glances settled upon Belarus.
With open arms
Unlike Russia and Ukraine, which also banned gambling on its territory two months ago, Belarus has quite positive feelings towards this kind of business. The representatives of the Belarusian Ministry of sport and tourism, which is responsible for regulating the gambling industry, say there are no plans to make gambling taboo in Belarus. On the contrary, there is interest in creating big casinos.
At the moment, there are more than 8,000 casinos and gambling halls in this small country, which borders both Russia and Ukraine. However, they are for the most part minor enterprises. Foreign capital share in this business is only 10 per cent, and Belarusian authorities clearly do not mind raising this share, as in this case gambling would become a more substantial source of income for the country’s budget. So far, the state is getting just over $13 million annually, and it will certainly be glad to increase this sum (Moscow alone used to get some $120 million annually from the gambling business).
Thus, Belarus will greatly appreciate Russia’s gambling industry (as well as the Ukrainian) moving to its territory. According to Vasily Korzun from the Belarusian Ministry of Sport and Tourism, Belarus is interested in attracting big players to the gambling sector, and it would be glad if Russia’s assets come to the country.
And it seems that Belarus has even been preparing to welcome Russian business. At the moment, President Aleksandr Lukashenko is ready to sign a decree “on some measures for improving the procedure for carrying out activities in the sphere of the gambling business”. According to Lukashenko, this decree is to make gambling laws in Belarus “the best in the world”. Rumors has it that the new laws will open up a wide door for Russian investment into Belarus. Belarusian authorities expect that the Russian gambling business will decide against spending the estimated $10-12 billion to develop the four ‘gambling zones’, as it is too much money in a time of economic crisis, and would rather create the fifth ‘zone’ in Belarus. The country has good infrastructure, and importantly, it is closer to Moscow than the Kaliningrad region.
Moreover, there are plans to build a large gambling and entertainment complex near Minsk Airport, so that the clients will be able to go to the casino right after touching down. The draft document on this issue is now at the Belarusian Ministry Council for approval. The complex is to be situated in a duty-free zone, and a citizen of any state will be able to stay there for 72 hours.
Adaptation
However, there are rumors that only big players will be able to play by the new rules, which means that hard times will come for the Belarusian gambling business, most of which is represented by small companies. Some in the Belarusian media even claim to have seen the draft presidential decree, which, they say, raises the necessary authorized funds to heights unreachable for many Belarusian companies – 50,000 euros for casinos and gambling halls. This sum should be deposited in a bank to guarantee awards to the winners. At the moment, the required authorized fund is the same for gambling and all other companies in the country (around $1000). Another new rule is that all playing machines should have a return rate of 90%. There are no machines of such quality in Belarus at the moment (usually the rate is 80-85%, like in most countries of the world), while in Russia that rule was introduced several years before.
And these are not the only reasons why Belarusian gambling investors might oppose the government plans. Specialists underline that the Russian entertainment monsters would fight savagely for the Minsk market – a battle not likely to be won by Belarusian companies. So in a year or two, the whole industry would be concentrated, obviously, out of Belarusian hands. Besides this, the new rules would break up many local gambling businesses in the country’s small cities, which are the basis of many of the regional elite’s well-being.
On the other hand, there are optimists in Belarus who say that the increased flow of Russian gamblers will outstrip the costs of increased competition. All in all, specialists say it will take Belarusian companies around 2 years to adapt to the new rules, if they are accepted. But for many local businessmen, being a manager in a big Russian company is not much worse than having a business of their own, which means constant struggles with red tape. That is why it may well turn out that, together with the government, they just wait until the Russian businessmen pull all the chestnuts out of the fire for them.
Darya Sologub for RT
пятница, 10 июля 2009 г.
The untold story of Aleksandr Lukashenko
10 July, 2009, 18:30
On this day 15 years ago Belarus chose its first irreplaceable president, but what is behind the rhetoric of the “last dictator of Europe”? It is time to take a look into this long-lasting presidency.
Lukashenko’s victory in the second tour of the election on July 10, 1994, was a surprise for many. The clear favourite before the results were announced was Lukashenko’s rival Vyacheslav Kebich, then-head of the Belarusian government. However, the Belarusians seemed to place more confidence in the director of the Gorodets state farm and deputy of the Supreme Council Aleksandr Lukashenko. He made the impression of a man closer to the people and more sympathetic with their needs. His trump card was the anti-corruption rhetoric and activities which he performed as the head of the parliamentary anti-corruption committee. This part of his image not only proved useful in the time of the struggle for power, but became the fundamental element of Lukashenko’s image for years to come.
Lukashenko came to power as a pure joker – none of Belarus’ foreign partners had a clear attitude towards him. Some said he was well acquainted with Russian special services which approved him as a candidate. Others said that his political ties with Russia were mainly of a “leftist” nature. It is known that his speech at the Russian State Duma in 1994, which brought him more points during the electoral campaign in Belarus, became possible due to support from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and personally Gennady Zyuganov.
The West was extremely short of information about the new Belarusian president and enthusiastically involved him in international affairs. In 1994–1995 Aleksandr Lukashenko met the US president Bill Clinton, and made an official tour across Western Europe. Yet very soon the Belarusian president had to make geopolitical choices, which led to a deterioration of Belarus-West relations for the following years.
The “wild 1990s”
The young (he was only 40 then) president came to power in a country which was nearing collapse. More and more plants of a once developed and industrial Belarus were closing. People weren’t getting wages. The cooperation ties of Belarusian enterprises with their Russian and other ex-USSR partners were broken and the times when Belarus was called the “assembly room” of the USSR seemed to have passed forever.
At the same time Aleksandr Lukashenko could not get loans from the IMF or World Bank to support manufacturers, as the international bodies’ plans of liberalization and deregulation of economy would finish off deteriorating industries. And that was exactly the opposite of what he had intended to do. In the 2000s Lukashenko frequently recalled the 1994–1995 period of political struggle in his meetings with common people in different regions of Belarus. At every such meeting he asked the workers and farmers one question: “Shall we liberalize the economy, fire about half the employees and make our enterprises cost-effective, raise the salaries of those still employed and let the fired seek a better life as entrepreneurs; or shall we keep a centralized state-dominated economy, preserve the jobs with low salaries and gradually improve the work of enterprises?” The people always preferred the latter. According to Lukashenko, that was what defined his geopolitical choice in the 1990s.
In reality the choice was based not only on the “will of the people” but also on purely objective factors and Lukashenko’s rational calculations. On the one hand, choosing the “liberal project” meant firing about half the employed Belarusian workforce with no prospect of small business enterprises created for them, which meant a social catastrophe. On the other hand, there was no other political basis for Lukashenko but the post-Soviet industrial and agricultural elites of numerous Belarusian state enterprises. The second major force in Belarus of the 1990s was presented by the nationalist pro-Western groups who despised the new president, regarding him as a “kolkhoznik” (peasant), and would never give him a hand. That was why Lukashenko decided to put the preservation of Belarus’ heavy industry and state collective farms at the core of his political program.
“Neo-Soviet” project
That decision had imminent geopolitical implications. Belarus had to restore its former cooperative ties with suppliers and consumers in the CIS countries, but first of all in Russia. That was exactly why from 1994 on Aleksandr Lukashenko became the self-proclaimed but recognized leader of the reintegration movement in the post-Soviet area.
Belarus sought benefits while the Russian elite decided to use the reintegration rhetoric in order to widen the support for Boris Yeltsin, who was said to have only 2% approval rating at the beginning of the 1996 presidential campaign.
Thus, restoring a state-centered economy with emphasis on heavy industry and reintegrating at least a part of the former USSR became the two objectives which shaped the so called “neo-Soviet project” – the basis of Lukashenko’s legitimacy for ten successive years.
There was a strong opposition to the “neosovietism” from Belarusian liberals, nationalists and those who hoped to become the “Belarusian Chubais” (“Chubais” was a name for anybody who wanted to organize privatization and make money on this). Many people of the initial “Lukashenko team” left him and became perpetual leaders of the opposition, while he became the leader of the state. It was then that a number of ex-Lukashenko and then-opposition figures disappeared. They were believed by many to have been killed on the order of the Belarusian president.
“Power is might”
All in all, the struggle for power was fierce and the Belarus of the mid-1990s was a time of thousands gathering, riots and street fights. Aleksandr Lukashenko even became the target of an assassination attempt in the town of Liozno in 1994, but that time he was saved by his close associate Viktor Sheiman – one of the few persons who, still today, stayed with the president.
Maybe it was then that Aleksandr Lukashenko decided that he had no choice but to build strong, even hard presidential power in the country. Two years after the election he dissolved the Supreme Council (Parliament) and organized a referendum at which a new edition of the Belarusian Constitution was adopted (the results of the referendum are disputed by the opposition and claimed fraudulent in the West). The document gave the president vast powers in comparison with the previous one.
Later, Aleksandr Lukashenko even compared the Belarus of those days to Germany in 1920-40: “The history of Germany is similar to the history of Belarus, at certain periods. In its time, Germany was raised from the ruins due to very strong power; and not only bad things in Germany were connected with the well-known Adolf Hitler. No process or person can be labeled exclusively as black or white. Hitler formed a strong Germany due to strong presidential power.” However, those words referred only to the role of the president in the country. In general it was anti-Nazism and the cult of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War which were made the fundamental value of the Belarusian state.
Phantom in international politics: the Union State
The end of the 1990s was marked by a relatively calm political situation in Belarus. In spite of the financial-economic crisis of 1997–1998 the Belarusian economy sustained its growth. The public opposition to Lukashenko became weaker, his popularity with the people in both Belarus and Russia got stronger. And that probably was the main factor for the Belarusian president’s continuing integration enthusiasm.
As if to prepare Belarusians to the union with Russia, Aleksandr Lukashenko was pointing out the importance of the Russian language to Belarus: “People, who speak Belarusian, cannot do anything else but speak Belarusian, because one cannot express something great in this language. Belarusian is a weak language. There are only two great languages in the world – Russian and English.” Incidentally, it was due to the results of Lukashenko’s first 1995 referendum that Russian was given equal status with Belarusian in Belarus.
Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Russian counterpart was the old Boris Yeltsin who was in poor health and was spending more and more time at hospital. Thus, many analysts believed that Lukashenko hoped to become the president of both the countries in 2000 or 2001. That would be the proper application for the Union State treaty signed symbolically in Belovezhskaya Pushcha on December 8, 1999 – exactly eight years after the 1991 Belovezhskaya accords which officially dissolved the USSR.
Yet those hopes did not last long. Twenty-three days after signing the Union State treaty Boris Yeltsin surprisingly resigned, giving Aleksandr Lukashenko probably the worst present he ever got for the New Year. Was it the threat of Batka’s coming to power in Moscow which made Russian elites finally agree on a candidate to become Yeltsin’s successor? Regardless, the power in Russia was taken up by a young and enthusiastic Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This rearrangement marked the beginning of the Union State project’s long-lasting crisis – the single state of Russia and Belarus had not been created up to now.
Lukashenko’s disappointment with the new situation grew into alleged personal dislike towards Vladimir Putin, but those personal shades did not affect the relations of the two countries until the world oil prices began quickly and steadily rising after 9/11. As analysts agree, that process fomented Russia’s role as Europe’s raw-material supplier and moved the interests of heavy non-raw-material industry to the periphery of state interests. That considerably devalued Belarus’ importance to Russia and made elites in Moscow reconsider the foundations of the Union. Instead of equal rights confirmed by the Union State treaty, the Russian government proposed the idea of Belarus’ reforming into six regions of the Russian Federation – an idea completely unacceptable both to the Belarusian elite and common people.
Further reconsideration of the Union revealed that the Belarusian economy was heavily subsidized by Russia: Belarus paid reduced prices for gas and was not charged with an export duty for the imported Russian oil, which it reprocessed and further exported to Europe, receiving a substantial margin. In 2004–2008 those “subsidies” were considerably cut, which led to a number of rows between the allies (the most important in 2006, when Russia reintroduced the export duty for oil going to Belarus) and major changes in Belarusian politics. The most important of those was the beginning of Belarusian “multiple-vector” external policy which, first of all, meant restoring normal relations with Europe and the United States.
All or nothing
The “multiple-vector” policy never turned into a “European project” for Aleksandr Lukashenko. Despite some progress in mutual relations there is still an abyss between the West and Belarus. That was once again proved by the recent PACE resolution on Belarus demanding the abolition of capital punishment and 28 more political changes which would completely transform the Belarusian political system and make Lukashenko’s legitimacy dependent on Brussels’ approval.
Furthermore, everyone in Belarus is skeptical of prospective economic cooperation with Europe. A significant part of Belarusian production would be uncompetitive on the European market and it is already clear that the EU is not going to subsidize Belarus at even half the Russian level. That is how Belarus finds itself in a trap while the world financial crisis rages around it.
An interesting peculiarity of the situation around Belarus is that there had not been an independent autonomous state in this part of Europe for some 500 years. Since the middle of the 16th century the territory of Belarus was included into either some Western state or Russia. That not only made the independence a brand new challenge for Belarusians (that is why some people in Belarus call Lukashenko “Vitovt of the 21st century” – by the name of the Grand Duke of Lithuania who made his country an autonomous Eastern European power which, however, didn’t last long), but also created the “Belarusian problem” for the West and Russia. Both of them seem to have no model of treating an independent state in Eastern Europe which does not fit into traditional geopolitical schemes. The only project for this region is the “cordon sanitaire” between Europe and Russia – a destructive invention of British geopolitics designed to prevent the rapid development of Eurasia. At the moment, Belarus is being pulled into this project by some European circles (mainly Britain, assisted by partners in Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine).
Thus, Aleksandr Lukashenko is back where he started from. At the time of the world economic crisis accepting the “European perspective” would mean destroying national industry, becoming hostile to Russia and eventually losing sovereignty. That is hard to accept, but it seems that there is no one in Belarus to offer another perspective. This means that in the nearest future we will see either an implementation of some new project masterminded by the Belarusian president, or the great tragedy of a man losing all the gains of the past 15 years.
Darya Sologub for RT
On this day 15 years ago Belarus chose its first irreplaceable president, but what is behind the rhetoric of the “last dictator of Europe”? It is time to take a look into this long-lasting presidency.
Lukashenko’s victory in the second tour of the election on July 10, 1994, was a surprise for many. The clear favourite before the results were announced was Lukashenko’s rival Vyacheslav Kebich, then-head of the Belarusian government. However, the Belarusians seemed to place more confidence in the director of the Gorodets state farm and deputy of the Supreme Council Aleksandr Lukashenko. He made the impression of a man closer to the people and more sympathetic with their needs. His trump card was the anti-corruption rhetoric and activities which he performed as the head of the parliamentary anti-corruption committee. This part of his image not only proved useful in the time of the struggle for power, but became the fundamental element of Lukashenko’s image for years to come.
Lukashenko came to power as a pure joker – none of Belarus’ foreign partners had a clear attitude towards him. Some said he was well acquainted with Russian special services which approved him as a candidate. Others said that his political ties with Russia were mainly of a “leftist” nature. It is known that his speech at the Russian State Duma in 1994, which brought him more points during the electoral campaign in Belarus, became possible due to support from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and personally Gennady Zyuganov.
The West was extremely short of information about the new Belarusian president and enthusiastically involved him in international affairs. In 1994–1995 Aleksandr Lukashenko met the US president Bill Clinton, and made an official tour across Western Europe. Yet very soon the Belarusian president had to make geopolitical choices, which led to a deterioration of Belarus-West relations for the following years.
The “wild 1990s”
The young (he was only 40 then) president came to power in a country which was nearing collapse. More and more plants of a once developed and industrial Belarus were closing. People weren’t getting wages. The cooperation ties of Belarusian enterprises with their Russian and other ex-USSR partners were broken and the times when Belarus was called the “assembly room” of the USSR seemed to have passed forever.
At the same time Aleksandr Lukashenko could not get loans from the IMF or World Bank to support manufacturers, as the international bodies’ plans of liberalization and deregulation of economy would finish off deteriorating industries. And that was exactly the opposite of what he had intended to do. In the 2000s Lukashenko frequently recalled the 1994–1995 period of political struggle in his meetings with common people in different regions of Belarus. At every such meeting he asked the workers and farmers one question: “Shall we liberalize the economy, fire about half the employees and make our enterprises cost-effective, raise the salaries of those still employed and let the fired seek a better life as entrepreneurs; or shall we keep a centralized state-dominated economy, preserve the jobs with low salaries and gradually improve the work of enterprises?” The people always preferred the latter. According to Lukashenko, that was what defined his geopolitical choice in the 1990s.
In reality the choice was based not only on the “will of the people” but also on purely objective factors and Lukashenko’s rational calculations. On the one hand, choosing the “liberal project” meant firing about half the employed Belarusian workforce with no prospect of small business enterprises created for them, which meant a social catastrophe. On the other hand, there was no other political basis for Lukashenko but the post-Soviet industrial and agricultural elites of numerous Belarusian state enterprises. The second major force in Belarus of the 1990s was presented by the nationalist pro-Western groups who despised the new president, regarding him as a “kolkhoznik” (peasant), and would never give him a hand. That was why Lukashenko decided to put the preservation of Belarus’ heavy industry and state collective farms at the core of his political program.
“Neo-Soviet” project
That decision had imminent geopolitical implications. Belarus had to restore its former cooperative ties with suppliers and consumers in the CIS countries, but first of all in Russia. That was exactly why from 1994 on Aleksandr Lukashenko became the self-proclaimed but recognized leader of the reintegration movement in the post-Soviet area.
Belarus sought benefits while the Russian elite decided to use the reintegration rhetoric in order to widen the support for Boris Yeltsin, who was said to have only 2% approval rating at the beginning of the 1996 presidential campaign.
Thus, restoring a state-centered economy with emphasis on heavy industry and reintegrating at least a part of the former USSR became the two objectives which shaped the so called “neo-Soviet project” – the basis of Lukashenko’s legitimacy for ten successive years.
There was a strong opposition to the “neosovietism” from Belarusian liberals, nationalists and those who hoped to become the “Belarusian Chubais” (“Chubais” was a name for anybody who wanted to organize privatization and make money on this). Many people of the initial “Lukashenko team” left him and became perpetual leaders of the opposition, while he became the leader of the state. It was then that a number of ex-Lukashenko and then-opposition figures disappeared. They were believed by many to have been killed on the order of the Belarusian president.
“Power is might”
All in all, the struggle for power was fierce and the Belarus of the mid-1990s was a time of thousands gathering, riots and street fights. Aleksandr Lukashenko even became the target of an assassination attempt in the town of Liozno in 1994, but that time he was saved by his close associate Viktor Sheiman – one of the few persons who, still today, stayed with the president.
Maybe it was then that Aleksandr Lukashenko decided that he had no choice but to build strong, even hard presidential power in the country. Two years after the election he dissolved the Supreme Council (Parliament) and organized a referendum at which a new edition of the Belarusian Constitution was adopted (the results of the referendum are disputed by the opposition and claimed fraudulent in the West). The document gave the president vast powers in comparison with the previous one.
Later, Aleksandr Lukashenko even compared the Belarus of those days to Germany in 1920-40: “The history of Germany is similar to the history of Belarus, at certain periods. In its time, Germany was raised from the ruins due to very strong power; and not only bad things in Germany were connected with the well-known Adolf Hitler. No process or person can be labeled exclusively as black or white. Hitler formed a strong Germany due to strong presidential power.” However, those words referred only to the role of the president in the country. In general it was anti-Nazism and the cult of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War which were made the fundamental value of the Belarusian state.
Phantom in international politics: the Union State
The end of the 1990s was marked by a relatively calm political situation in Belarus. In spite of the financial-economic crisis of 1997–1998 the Belarusian economy sustained its growth. The public opposition to Lukashenko became weaker, his popularity with the people in both Belarus and Russia got stronger. And that probably was the main factor for the Belarusian president’s continuing integration enthusiasm.
As if to prepare Belarusians to the union with Russia, Aleksandr Lukashenko was pointing out the importance of the Russian language to Belarus: “People, who speak Belarusian, cannot do anything else but speak Belarusian, because one cannot express something great in this language. Belarusian is a weak language. There are only two great languages in the world – Russian and English.” Incidentally, it was due to the results of Lukashenko’s first 1995 referendum that Russian was given equal status with Belarusian in Belarus.
Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Russian counterpart was the old Boris Yeltsin who was in poor health and was spending more and more time at hospital. Thus, many analysts believed that Lukashenko hoped to become the president of both the countries in 2000 or 2001. That would be the proper application for the Union State treaty signed symbolically in Belovezhskaya Pushcha on December 8, 1999 – exactly eight years after the 1991 Belovezhskaya accords which officially dissolved the USSR.
Yet those hopes did not last long. Twenty-three days after signing the Union State treaty Boris Yeltsin surprisingly resigned, giving Aleksandr Lukashenko probably the worst present he ever got for the New Year. Was it the threat of Batka’s coming to power in Moscow which made Russian elites finally agree on a candidate to become Yeltsin’s successor? Regardless, the power in Russia was taken up by a young and enthusiastic Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This rearrangement marked the beginning of the Union State project’s long-lasting crisis – the single state of Russia and Belarus had not been created up to now.
Lukashenko’s disappointment with the new situation grew into alleged personal dislike towards Vladimir Putin, but those personal shades did not affect the relations of the two countries until the world oil prices began quickly and steadily rising after 9/11. As analysts agree, that process fomented Russia’s role as Europe’s raw-material supplier and moved the interests of heavy non-raw-material industry to the periphery of state interests. That considerably devalued Belarus’ importance to Russia and made elites in Moscow reconsider the foundations of the Union. Instead of equal rights confirmed by the Union State treaty, the Russian government proposed the idea of Belarus’ reforming into six regions of the Russian Federation – an idea completely unacceptable both to the Belarusian elite and common people.
Further reconsideration of the Union revealed that the Belarusian economy was heavily subsidized by Russia: Belarus paid reduced prices for gas and was not charged with an export duty for the imported Russian oil, which it reprocessed and further exported to Europe, receiving a substantial margin. In 2004–2008 those “subsidies” were considerably cut, which led to a number of rows between the allies (the most important in 2006, when Russia reintroduced the export duty for oil going to Belarus) and major changes in Belarusian politics. The most important of those was the beginning of Belarusian “multiple-vector” external policy which, first of all, meant restoring normal relations with Europe and the United States.
All or nothing
The “multiple-vector” policy never turned into a “European project” for Aleksandr Lukashenko. Despite some progress in mutual relations there is still an abyss between the West and Belarus. That was once again proved by the recent PACE resolution on Belarus demanding the abolition of capital punishment and 28 more political changes which would completely transform the Belarusian political system and make Lukashenko’s legitimacy dependent on Brussels’ approval.
Furthermore, everyone in Belarus is skeptical of prospective economic cooperation with Europe. A significant part of Belarusian production would be uncompetitive on the European market and it is already clear that the EU is not going to subsidize Belarus at even half the Russian level. That is how Belarus finds itself in a trap while the world financial crisis rages around it.
An interesting peculiarity of the situation around Belarus is that there had not been an independent autonomous state in this part of Europe for some 500 years. Since the middle of the 16th century the territory of Belarus was included into either some Western state or Russia. That not only made the independence a brand new challenge for Belarusians (that is why some people in Belarus call Lukashenko “Vitovt of the 21st century” – by the name of the Grand Duke of Lithuania who made his country an autonomous Eastern European power which, however, didn’t last long), but also created the “Belarusian problem” for the West and Russia. Both of them seem to have no model of treating an independent state in Eastern Europe which does not fit into traditional geopolitical schemes. The only project for this region is the “cordon sanitaire” between Europe and Russia – a destructive invention of British geopolitics designed to prevent the rapid development of Eurasia. At the moment, Belarus is being pulled into this project by some European circles (mainly Britain, assisted by partners in Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine).
Thus, Aleksandr Lukashenko is back where he started from. At the time of the world economic crisis accepting the “European perspective” would mean destroying national industry, becoming hostile to Russia and eventually losing sovereignty. That is hard to accept, but it seems that there is no one in Belarus to offer another perspective. This means that in the nearest future we will see either an implementation of some new project masterminded by the Belarusian president, or the great tragedy of a man losing all the gains of the past 15 years.
Darya Sologub for RT
четверг, 18 июня 2009 г.
Russia-Belarus: who is milking who?
18 June, 2009, 13:47
After the Russia-Belarus row over dairy products ended in a “compromise” and insignificant changes in the list of Belarusian supplies to Russia, one cannot help but wonder what it was all about.
Was it Moscow or Minsk that hoped for some better outcome which, for whatever reason, did not occur? Or was it much ado about nothing?
Lost in translation
On June 6 Russia’s Chief Sanitary Inspector Gennady Onishchenko banned around 500 items of Belarusian dairy products from being traded in Russian shops and supermarkets. At the time it seemed like an ordinary economic policy move, at least for the Russians. But for Belarus, which is suffering bitterly from the economic crisis, the disruption of the milk exports – a source of around US$1 billion yearly for the country’s budget – immediately became a political matter.
About 45% of the country’s dairy plants’ production is sold to Russia. The protraction of the crisis threatened to destroy not only the milk industry (producers claim they would need years to find new markets comparable to Russia’s), but also the whole agriculture sector – the pride of Mr.Lukashenko, who has been investing in it billions of dollars annually. It is also worth saying that a few days before the row, Russia refused to pay the last US$500 million tranche of a $2 billion loan it promised Belarus at the end of 2008. This alone brought Belarus to the brink of financial catastrophe. But beyond all actual and potential economic losses, a long pause in Belarus-Russia dairy trade would mean the destruction of the Belarusian President’s electoral base. That would mean social and political unrest in the republic in the nearest future.
The first week of the milk row was like a talk between blind, deaf and dumb people: Russia’s media did not pay much attention to the issue, while Minsk was feverishly seeking a way to solve the problem. Belarusian experts, media and state authorities were getting more and more hysterical, and even Russophobic, while most of their Russian counterparts saw nothing special. That is why the Belarusian leader’s stance on the CSTO summit in Moscow came as an unpleasant surprise. Then we heard that Russia’s leadership was going to consider a means of “punishing” its “unfaithful” ally. However, in the following days – from June 15 to June 17 – no major offensive steps were taken, while Belarus managed to introduce a 1-day customs control on the border with Russia. The conflict ended up in an agreement to reduce the quantity of Belarusian desiccated milk and increase the volume of cheese, curds and other dairy products exported from Belarus to Russia.
Takeover with “bear” hands?
There was no doubt in Belarus that Gennady Onischenko’s activities were a sign of a strategic political intention aimed at Minsk. Belarusian authorities were looking for the “person behind” Russia’s Chief Sanitary Inspector, and the logic of the recent relations with Russia led them directly to the figure Vladimir Putin, who is still perceived in Belarus as the “real holder” of supreme leadership in Russia. Throughout last spring, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko repeatedly claimed that the Federal Government (i.e. Vladimir Putin) was sabotaging the realization of agreements that he and Dmitry Medvedev concluded during their bilateral meetings. Thus, in the view of the politicians in Minsk the milk row was just the next step.
A few days ago, the majority of Belarusian experts also did not doubt that Mr. Putin had his reasons to attack Belarus on the eve of the CSTO summit. They were only discussing what his motives were. Among the most popular versions were the lobbying of Russia’s milk industry, an attempt at a corporate forcible takeover of Belarus’ dairy industry and the punishment of Minsk for participation in the EU-Eastern Partnership program. The most radical of the commentators even stated that the milk affair was the preparation of an anti-Lukashenko coup d’etat in Belarus, controlled from Moscow. However, the Belarusian President himself named the conflict yet another attempt of “taking us with bare hands”, referring to the alleged Russian oligarchs’ intent to buy up Belarusian industry at low crisis prices.
However, when the conflict ended up with no particular advantage to any of the sides, the Belarusian expert community was left to wonder what prize Moscow had received (or hoped to get) in the end.
Is everything like it used to be?
Frankly, the theory that the Russian Prime Minister deliberately fueled the conflict right before the CSTO summit – which was to adopt new instruments for creating the Russia-centered regional security system in Central Asia (an idea actively promoted by Vladimir Putin’s associates) – seems not very sound. It would have been in the Russian Prime Minister’s interests to provide the summit decisions with as much unanimity as possible. This is also true for President Dmitry Medvedev, who a couple of weeks earlier expressed Russia’s interest in buying the Belarusian milk industry. That was a statement many Minsk analysts also mentioned in the days of the conflict.
Some versions discussed in Belarus say Putin was a passive player. Belarusian political analyst Victor Andreyev writes in his blog: “It seems that Russian liberals used V. Putin’s personal dislike towards Lukashenko for discriminating against V. Putin himself. And the pro-western figures in the Belarusian leadership played along with them”.
In any case, was the end of the conflict a return to the status quo? Belarusian analysts see the Moscow agreements and the new conditions for the Belarusian dairy products’ export to Russia as a pure Minsk victory. Belarusian expert Yury Shevtsov, for example, wrote in his blog: “If there is no joker in it, it is an incredibly pure and explicit victory. I cannot believe it! … So much has been done for the Belarus’ rapprochement with the West, as well as for the creation of an anti-Union lobby in Russia itself! Lukashenko’s hands are untied for any agreement with Turkmenistan, Western states etc, and those agreements are being prepared in full swing”.
In fact there is hardly anything Russia can set against such a diagnosis. Having gained only minor concessions in bilateral trade the Russian leadership is actually creating a new trouble-spot at its western borders, which may become a “second Ukraine”. Bearing in mind the shaky situation in Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus, as well as high tensions in Russia-Ukraine relations and problems in the Russian economy, this is not good news for Moscow. By common estimate, such a complication might deepen the differences inside the Russian political elite.
Darya Sologub for RT
After the Russia-Belarus row over dairy products ended in a “compromise” and insignificant changes in the list of Belarusian supplies to Russia, one cannot help but wonder what it was all about.
Was it Moscow or Minsk that hoped for some better outcome which, for whatever reason, did not occur? Or was it much ado about nothing?
Lost in translation
On June 6 Russia’s Chief Sanitary Inspector Gennady Onishchenko banned around 500 items of Belarusian dairy products from being traded in Russian shops and supermarkets. At the time it seemed like an ordinary economic policy move, at least for the Russians. But for Belarus, which is suffering bitterly from the economic crisis, the disruption of the milk exports – a source of around US$1 billion yearly for the country’s budget – immediately became a political matter.
About 45% of the country’s dairy plants’ production is sold to Russia. The protraction of the crisis threatened to destroy not only the milk industry (producers claim they would need years to find new markets comparable to Russia’s), but also the whole agriculture sector – the pride of Mr.Lukashenko, who has been investing in it billions of dollars annually. It is also worth saying that a few days before the row, Russia refused to pay the last US$500 million tranche of a $2 billion loan it promised Belarus at the end of 2008. This alone brought Belarus to the brink of financial catastrophe. But beyond all actual and potential economic losses, a long pause in Belarus-Russia dairy trade would mean the destruction of the Belarusian President’s electoral base. That would mean social and political unrest in the republic in the nearest future.
The first week of the milk row was like a talk between blind, deaf and dumb people: Russia’s media did not pay much attention to the issue, while Minsk was feverishly seeking a way to solve the problem. Belarusian experts, media and state authorities were getting more and more hysterical, and even Russophobic, while most of their Russian counterparts saw nothing special. That is why the Belarusian leader’s stance on the CSTO summit in Moscow came as an unpleasant surprise. Then we heard that Russia’s leadership was going to consider a means of “punishing” its “unfaithful” ally. However, in the following days – from June 15 to June 17 – no major offensive steps were taken, while Belarus managed to introduce a 1-day customs control on the border with Russia. The conflict ended up in an agreement to reduce the quantity of Belarusian desiccated milk and increase the volume of cheese, curds and other dairy products exported from Belarus to Russia.
Takeover with “bear” hands?
There was no doubt in Belarus that Gennady Onischenko’s activities were a sign of a strategic political intention aimed at Minsk. Belarusian authorities were looking for the “person behind” Russia’s Chief Sanitary Inspector, and the logic of the recent relations with Russia led them directly to the figure Vladimir Putin, who is still perceived in Belarus as the “real holder” of supreme leadership in Russia. Throughout last spring, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko repeatedly claimed that the Federal Government (i.e. Vladimir Putin) was sabotaging the realization of agreements that he and Dmitry Medvedev concluded during their bilateral meetings. Thus, in the view of the politicians in Minsk the milk row was just the next step.
A few days ago, the majority of Belarusian experts also did not doubt that Mr. Putin had his reasons to attack Belarus on the eve of the CSTO summit. They were only discussing what his motives were. Among the most popular versions were the lobbying of Russia’s milk industry, an attempt at a corporate forcible takeover of Belarus’ dairy industry and the punishment of Minsk for participation in the EU-Eastern Partnership program. The most radical of the commentators even stated that the milk affair was the preparation of an anti-Lukashenko coup d’etat in Belarus, controlled from Moscow. However, the Belarusian President himself named the conflict yet another attempt of “taking us with bare hands”, referring to the alleged Russian oligarchs’ intent to buy up Belarusian industry at low crisis prices.
However, when the conflict ended up with no particular advantage to any of the sides, the Belarusian expert community was left to wonder what prize Moscow had received (or hoped to get) in the end.
Is everything like it used to be?
Frankly, the theory that the Russian Prime Minister deliberately fueled the conflict right before the CSTO summit – which was to adopt new instruments for creating the Russia-centered regional security system in Central Asia (an idea actively promoted by Vladimir Putin’s associates) – seems not very sound. It would have been in the Russian Prime Minister’s interests to provide the summit decisions with as much unanimity as possible. This is also true for President Dmitry Medvedev, who a couple of weeks earlier expressed Russia’s interest in buying the Belarusian milk industry. That was a statement many Minsk analysts also mentioned in the days of the conflict.
Some versions discussed in Belarus say Putin was a passive player. Belarusian political analyst Victor Andreyev writes in his blog: “It seems that Russian liberals used V. Putin’s personal dislike towards Lukashenko for discriminating against V. Putin himself. And the pro-western figures in the Belarusian leadership played along with them”.
In any case, was the end of the conflict a return to the status quo? Belarusian analysts see the Moscow agreements and the new conditions for the Belarusian dairy products’ export to Russia as a pure Minsk victory. Belarusian expert Yury Shevtsov, for example, wrote in his blog: “If there is no joker in it, it is an incredibly pure and explicit victory. I cannot believe it! … So much has been done for the Belarus’ rapprochement with the West, as well as for the creation of an anti-Union lobby in Russia itself! Lukashenko’s hands are untied for any agreement with Turkmenistan, Western states etc, and those agreements are being prepared in full swing”.
In fact there is hardly anything Russia can set against such a diagnosis. Having gained only minor concessions in bilateral trade the Russian leadership is actually creating a new trouble-spot at its western borders, which may become a “second Ukraine”. Bearing in mind the shaky situation in Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus, as well as high tensions in Russia-Ukraine relations and problems in the Russian economy, this is not good news for Moscow. By common estimate, such a complication might deepen the differences inside the Russian political elite.
Darya Sologub for RT
среда, 29 апреля 2009 г.
ahead of the EU summit on Eastern Partnership
Bridging the East-West divide: Is Belarus the answer?
27 April, 2009, 12:32
In his annual message to the Parliament, Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko said that his country’s mission is to become “a bridge between the East and the West."
On May 7, Belarus is to become a participant of the Eastern partnership program at the EU summit in Prague. Minsk considers this initiative, designed in Brussels with an aim to promoting cooperation with the so-called Eastern neighbours that the EU shares with Russia, as an opportunity to improve political and economic relations with Europe. Such an improvement in relations is particularly important at a time of economic crisis when Russia, as Belarus' closest ally that also has a lot on its plate right now, cannot always be available for assistance.
But at the same time, the program arouses the problem of compatibility between the Eastern partnership initiatives with Belarus’ obligations under agreements it signed with Russia, and other ex-Soviet countries.
Hidden agendas
First, let us look at the plan to develop “deep and comprehensive free trade areas with each country” of the Eastern partnership. It would be a challenge to create common economic space with Belarus, as it is already a participant of different trade agreements with Russia, and within the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC). Thus, the implementation of this EU project would require creating a free-trade area including both the EU and some EAEC countries.
There is another obstacle in the way of Belarus towards a “free trade area” with the EU. According to the text of the Eastern partnership program, the creation of the free trade areas will be possible only after the Eastern partners join the WTO. Belarus has recently confirmed its will to join the organization, but being an EAEC member, it has to coordinate its moves with its fellow members – and they do not see eye-to-eye with each other. Some say they should create the regional trade union first, and only after that, join the global organization. Others say they could move towards accession to the WTO, and integrate on the regional level simultaneously. Anyway, Belarus will have to do a great job to join the WTO.
Second, customs control according to the Eastern partnership is to be finally transferred to the outside borders of the whole enlarged community (in the case of Belarus, to the border with Russia). However, the agreements between Belarus and Russia provide that there will be no border between the two countries, and their Union’s border will lie in the West – with Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. We also should take into account that the customs union is to be created within the EAEC between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan by 2010.
Third, the Eastern partnership offers the mobility and security initiative, which is set to create a visa-free area between the EU and the partners. In this regard, Belarus would have to solve the problem of how to provide freedom of movement for people between itself and Russia, and at the same time, the same freedom between itself and the EU. The only sound way would be to create a single visa-free area for the EU, Russia, and Belarus, which is close to science fiction.
Then goes the energy security initiative, which assumes that Belarus would accept the European conception of energy security, reform its legislation according to this concept, enter the single energy area with Europe, and implement mutual energy support and security mechanisms. For Belarus, as a transit country and a consumer of energy resources, the EU’s proposals are, of course, attractive. However, Minsk understands that this is quite difficult to play by EU rules without losing Russia’s friendly support, which will be more valuable and tangible in the foreseeable future (in the first place, on the issue of gas prices).
Finally, the European Partnership is to advance cooperation on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The document assumes that the partners will take part in missions and actions taken within the ESDP. It says that the systems of early warning should be improved with particular attention to the conflict areas. Though this appears very diplomatic and abstract, the initiative can have serious latent contradictions to Belarus’ obligations by the Union agreement with Russia. Though this agreement does not prohibit Belarus from taking part in security and defence projects with other countries (Belarus is cooperating with NATO in the framework of a special bilateral program), the contradiction would turn into a conflict if Minsk ignores Russia’s security interests.
Total all the minuses…
The question is what is left for Belarus from the Eastern partnership program? As if answering this question, the European commissioner for External relations and European neighbourhood policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner said on April 23 that this country will be able to participate only in the multilateral track of the Eastern partnership, not in the bilateral. As she explained, the bilateral track of the program “does not exist” for Belarus. This is not discrimination though, but the result of the complicated Belarus-EU relations of the last 15 years. Belarus is the only country among participants of the program that has no Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Brussels. Without a PCA or an Interim Agreement, relations between Belarus and the EU are still covered by provisions of the 1989 Agreement between the EU and the former Soviet Union.
On the other hand, the European partnership is announced as a flexible instrument. Minsk expects to have some space for maneuver within the program to soft-pedal controversial and sensitive issues, and to promote issues that would interest it from political and economic points of view. However, one should not overestimate the importance of the economic incentives the Eastern partnership offers. For all the initiatives within the program, the EU is ready to provide 600 million euros. Some experts estimate that Belarus is to get only 21 million dollars out of that sum, while last year it got 11 billion dollars in credits and subsidies from Russia. Minsk, which has already taken loans from Russia, the IMF, and Venezuela, still needs an extra 8 billion dollars by the end of the year to fix its foreign trade deficit. So the money the EU offers is nothing to speak seriously about. That is why the advantages Minsk hopes to get from participating in the program lie in the area of improving the country’s image, investment attractiveness, and political dialogue with the EU.
However, that would be difficult without losing some ground. The main focus of the Eastern partnership is on the convergence with EU legislation and standards. Besides, as the European commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner said, the EU is going to operate on a "more for more" principle. And this principle is exactly what Belarus cannot meet without straining relations with Russia. So, it looks like the Eastern partnership will depend on sophisticated negotiations and compromise between Minsk, Moscow, and Brussels.
Darya Sologub for RT
The Eastern partnership is a program initiated by the European Union to forge further political association and economic integration with its neighbours: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
The plan to achieve these goals is to go ahead on both a bilateral and a multilateral track:
The bilateral track is a framework for cooperation between the EU and each of the partner countries. It includes:
upgrading contractual relations towards association agreements;
the prospect of negotiations to put in place deep and comprehensive free trade areas with each country, and greater support to meet the related requirements leading to the establishment of a network of FTAs that can grow into a Neighbourhood Economic Community in the longer term;
progressive visa liberalization in a secure environment;
deeper cooperation to enhance the energy security of the partners and the EU;
support for economic and social policies designed to reduce disparities within each partner country and across borders.A new Comprehensive Institution-Building (CIB) program will be needed to improve the capacity of each partner to undertake the necessary reforms.
The multilateral track is designed to provide a new framework whereby common challenges can be addressed. Four policy platforms are proposed within this framework:
democracy, good governance, and stability;
economic integration and convergence with EU policies;
energy security, and contacts between people;
a number of flagship initiatives supporting the aims of the Eastern Partnership to be funded through multi-donor support, IFIs. and the private sector.
27 April, 2009, 12:32
In his annual message to the Parliament, Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko said that his country’s mission is to become “a bridge between the East and the West."
On May 7, Belarus is to become a participant of the Eastern partnership program at the EU summit in Prague. Minsk considers this initiative, designed in Brussels with an aim to promoting cooperation with the so-called Eastern neighbours that the EU shares with Russia, as an opportunity to improve political and economic relations with Europe. Such an improvement in relations is particularly important at a time of economic crisis when Russia, as Belarus' closest ally that also has a lot on its plate right now, cannot always be available for assistance.
But at the same time, the program arouses the problem of compatibility between the Eastern partnership initiatives with Belarus’ obligations under agreements it signed with Russia, and other ex-Soviet countries.
Hidden agendas
First, let us look at the plan to develop “deep and comprehensive free trade areas with each country” of the Eastern partnership. It would be a challenge to create common economic space with Belarus, as it is already a participant of different trade agreements with Russia, and within the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC). Thus, the implementation of this EU project would require creating a free-trade area including both the EU and some EAEC countries.
There is another obstacle in the way of Belarus towards a “free trade area” with the EU. According to the text of the Eastern partnership program, the creation of the free trade areas will be possible only after the Eastern partners join the WTO. Belarus has recently confirmed its will to join the organization, but being an EAEC member, it has to coordinate its moves with its fellow members – and they do not see eye-to-eye with each other. Some say they should create the regional trade union first, and only after that, join the global organization. Others say they could move towards accession to the WTO, and integrate on the regional level simultaneously. Anyway, Belarus will have to do a great job to join the WTO.
Second, customs control according to the Eastern partnership is to be finally transferred to the outside borders of the whole enlarged community (in the case of Belarus, to the border with Russia). However, the agreements between Belarus and Russia provide that there will be no border between the two countries, and their Union’s border will lie in the West – with Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. We also should take into account that the customs union is to be created within the EAEC between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan by 2010.
Third, the Eastern partnership offers the mobility and security initiative, which is set to create a visa-free area between the EU and the partners. In this regard, Belarus would have to solve the problem of how to provide freedom of movement for people between itself and Russia, and at the same time, the same freedom between itself and the EU. The only sound way would be to create a single visa-free area for the EU, Russia, and Belarus, which is close to science fiction.
Then goes the energy security initiative, which assumes that Belarus would accept the European conception of energy security, reform its legislation according to this concept, enter the single energy area with Europe, and implement mutual energy support and security mechanisms. For Belarus, as a transit country and a consumer of energy resources, the EU’s proposals are, of course, attractive. However, Minsk understands that this is quite difficult to play by EU rules without losing Russia’s friendly support, which will be more valuable and tangible in the foreseeable future (in the first place, on the issue of gas prices).
Finally, the European Partnership is to advance cooperation on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The document assumes that the partners will take part in missions and actions taken within the ESDP. It says that the systems of early warning should be improved with particular attention to the conflict areas. Though this appears very diplomatic and abstract, the initiative can have serious latent contradictions to Belarus’ obligations by the Union agreement with Russia. Though this agreement does not prohibit Belarus from taking part in security and defence projects with other countries (Belarus is cooperating with NATO in the framework of a special bilateral program), the contradiction would turn into a conflict if Minsk ignores Russia’s security interests.
Total all the minuses…
The question is what is left for Belarus from the Eastern partnership program? As if answering this question, the European commissioner for External relations and European neighbourhood policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner said on April 23 that this country will be able to participate only in the multilateral track of the Eastern partnership, not in the bilateral. As she explained, the bilateral track of the program “does not exist” for Belarus. This is not discrimination though, but the result of the complicated Belarus-EU relations of the last 15 years. Belarus is the only country among participants of the program that has no Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Brussels. Without a PCA or an Interim Agreement, relations between Belarus and the EU are still covered by provisions of the 1989 Agreement between the EU and the former Soviet Union.
On the other hand, the European partnership is announced as a flexible instrument. Minsk expects to have some space for maneuver within the program to soft-pedal controversial and sensitive issues, and to promote issues that would interest it from political and economic points of view. However, one should not overestimate the importance of the economic incentives the Eastern partnership offers. For all the initiatives within the program, the EU is ready to provide 600 million euros. Some experts estimate that Belarus is to get only 21 million dollars out of that sum, while last year it got 11 billion dollars in credits and subsidies from Russia. Minsk, which has already taken loans from Russia, the IMF, and Venezuela, still needs an extra 8 billion dollars by the end of the year to fix its foreign trade deficit. So the money the EU offers is nothing to speak seriously about. That is why the advantages Minsk hopes to get from participating in the program lie in the area of improving the country’s image, investment attractiveness, and political dialogue with the EU.
However, that would be difficult without losing some ground. The main focus of the Eastern partnership is on the convergence with EU legislation and standards. Besides, as the European commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner said, the EU is going to operate on a "more for more" principle. And this principle is exactly what Belarus cannot meet without straining relations with Russia. So, it looks like the Eastern partnership will depend on sophisticated negotiations and compromise between Minsk, Moscow, and Brussels.
Darya Sologub for RT
The Eastern partnership is a program initiated by the European Union to forge further political association and economic integration with its neighbours: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
The plan to achieve these goals is to go ahead on both a bilateral and a multilateral track:
The bilateral track is a framework for cooperation between the EU and each of the partner countries. It includes:
upgrading contractual relations towards association agreements;
the prospect of negotiations to put in place deep and comprehensive free trade areas with each country, and greater support to meet the related requirements leading to the establishment of a network of FTAs that can grow into a Neighbourhood Economic Community in the longer term;
progressive visa liberalization in a secure environment;
deeper cooperation to enhance the energy security of the partners and the EU;
support for economic and social policies designed to reduce disparities within each partner country and across borders.A new Comprehensive Institution-Building (CIB) program will be needed to improve the capacity of each partner to undertake the necessary reforms.
The multilateral track is designed to provide a new framework whereby common challenges can be addressed. Four policy platforms are proposed within this framework:
democracy, good governance, and stability;
economic integration and convergence with EU policies;
energy security, and contacts between people;
a number of flagship initiatives supporting the aims of the Eastern Partnership to be funded through multi-donor support, IFIs. and the private sector.
about A.Lukashenko's visit to Vatican
Aleksandr Lukashenko's first European destination: the Vatican
27 April, 2009, 20:47
Belarusian leader joins the club of Gordon Brown, Angela Merkel and Tony Blair and other heads of state who have paid a visit to Pope Benedict XVI
It is remarkable that the Belarusian president chose Italy as the first EU country to visit after officials in Brussels lifted visa restrictions on his travels to the European Union last year. It is more remarkable that the first person he met with there was Pope Benedict XVI.
It is no secret that contact with the Pope is an important part of world politics. Any president or other remarkable figure feels it his duty to meet the Holy Father. The Belarusian leader was well aware of the meaning of such a meeting. After he talked privately to Benedict XVI he now has at least one thing in common with major European politicians: Gordon Brown, Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, Tony Blair, etc. In light of the upcoming Prague summit, where the EU is to launch its ambitious European partnership program, this meeting definitely gives Aleksandr Lukashenko certain advantages. The trivial knocks he got from some Czech officials, who promised not to shake hands with him and not to let him out of the plane, have lost their edge after the Belarusian president has improved his image in the Pope’s parlour.
Many birds – many stones
However, it is not only his wish to receive political dividends prior to the Prague summit that has driven Aleksandr Lukashenko to go to the Vatican. Before the meeting, the Belarusian president said he was going to present the Pope with a number of questions from the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Kirill. Talking to the Pope, he also expressed hope that Benedict XVI would come to Belarus. The visit of the Pope to Belarus, which is a canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church, would itself be a notable event. Clearly, the Belarusian leader wants to play a role in organizing a historical meeting of the Pope and the Patriarch on Belarusian territory, and that was what he proposed to Patriarch Kirill while in Moscow this spring.
The idea to bring leaders of the two branches of Christianity together in Belarus is not a new one. Aleksandr Lukashenko proposed it as early as in 2002. However, today it has taken on an interesting twist: Kirill already met Benedict XVI several times as a head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church. He was also often criticized for his ecumenical policies, as he advocates for deeper cooperation with the Catholic Church. All this makes the possibility of a meeting between the leaders of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches greater than ever. And if Lukashenko’s proposal is accepted, Belarus will play an important role as a conciliator and a peacemaker. In this sense, Lukashenko is doing a great job, improving Belarus’ image on an international level and doing a favor for Kirill who, according to all indications, would like to meet the Pope.
At the same moment, by inviting Benedict XVI, Lukashenko may hope to solve another problem. The Catholic Church in Belarus has traditionally been regarded as a Polish church. Though the situation is changing, around 40% of Catholic priests in Belarus are from Poland (and have Polish citizenship). And while there are no inter-confessional problems on this ground, Catholicism in Belarus widely maintains a Polish identity for those Poles living there, which undermines the country’s ethnic unity. To change the situation, Belarusian authorities hope to put forth an idea of supporting the non-Polish Catholic Church in Belarus at the heart of the Pope’s visit. However, does the Belarusian leadership have the right understanding of the consequences of such a move?
Wait and see
If Aleksandr Lukashenko succeeds in making the Catholic Church in Belarus less associated with the Poles, the Church will become more popular. But contrary to what the Belarusian leadership wants, the “Polish party” will not play a smaller role there. At the moment Poland is implementing its “Polish Card” program for Belarusians, which is very popular in the Western regions. Polish Catholic priests are obtaining Belarusian citizenship. Also, Belarusia sees economic cooperation with Poland as a source of benefit during the crisis and Warsaw as one of the chief operators of the Eastern partnership program. Therefore, the real influence of Warsaw in Belarus will strengthen, though it will take another form.
In the global context, there are signs that the worldwide ecumenical project can be launched very soon. Just to mention Kirill’s pro-ecumenical views, the Urbi et Orbi blessing without the Filioque clause “and the Son” (according to the Orthodox tradition), which the Pope gave last year, as well as positive messages from both sides. However, if the Pope comes to Belarus and meets the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, the reaction of the Orthodox Church would not be as united and positive as it seems to be now. We would, inevitably, see the development of sectarianism and other internal conflicts.
We would see a similar reaction in Belarusian society. Though Aleksandr Lukashenko calls himself an Orthodox atheist, the leadership of the country partly receives its legitimacy from its Orthodoxy. The Belarusian president used to visit all Orthodox Easter services where he talked about the unique role of the Orthodox Church as a stabilizing factor in Belarusian society. This year he was not there. After Lukashenko’s meeting with Benedict XVI, and amidst talks of the possible Pope’s meeting with the Patriarch on Belarusian territory, many Orthodox Belarusians would regard their president’s behaviour as double-dealing. This change in attitude could lead to a very interesting shift in the political landscape, especially at a time of rapprochement with the West. Moreover, the same reaction can be expected from the large number of Orthodox Russians, who traditionally regarded Lukashenko as a defender of traditional values. Is the game worth the candle?
Darya Sologub for RT
27 April, 2009, 20:47
Belarusian leader joins the club of Gordon Brown, Angela Merkel and Tony Blair and other heads of state who have paid a visit to Pope Benedict XVI
It is remarkable that the Belarusian president chose Italy as the first EU country to visit after officials in Brussels lifted visa restrictions on his travels to the European Union last year. It is more remarkable that the first person he met with there was Pope Benedict XVI.
It is no secret that contact with the Pope is an important part of world politics. Any president or other remarkable figure feels it his duty to meet the Holy Father. The Belarusian leader was well aware of the meaning of such a meeting. After he talked privately to Benedict XVI he now has at least one thing in common with major European politicians: Gordon Brown, Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, Tony Blair, etc. In light of the upcoming Prague summit, where the EU is to launch its ambitious European partnership program, this meeting definitely gives Aleksandr Lukashenko certain advantages. The trivial knocks he got from some Czech officials, who promised not to shake hands with him and not to let him out of the plane, have lost their edge after the Belarusian president has improved his image in the Pope’s parlour.
Many birds – many stones
However, it is not only his wish to receive political dividends prior to the Prague summit that has driven Aleksandr Lukashenko to go to the Vatican. Before the meeting, the Belarusian president said he was going to present the Pope with a number of questions from the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, Kirill. Talking to the Pope, he also expressed hope that Benedict XVI would come to Belarus. The visit of the Pope to Belarus, which is a canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church, would itself be a notable event. Clearly, the Belarusian leader wants to play a role in organizing a historical meeting of the Pope and the Patriarch on Belarusian territory, and that was what he proposed to Patriarch Kirill while in Moscow this spring.
The idea to bring leaders of the two branches of Christianity together in Belarus is not a new one. Aleksandr Lukashenko proposed it as early as in 2002. However, today it has taken on an interesting twist: Kirill already met Benedict XVI several times as a head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church. He was also often criticized for his ecumenical policies, as he advocates for deeper cooperation with the Catholic Church. All this makes the possibility of a meeting between the leaders of the Orthodox and Catholic Churches greater than ever. And if Lukashenko’s proposal is accepted, Belarus will play an important role as a conciliator and a peacemaker. In this sense, Lukashenko is doing a great job, improving Belarus’ image on an international level and doing a favor for Kirill who, according to all indications, would like to meet the Pope.
At the same moment, by inviting Benedict XVI, Lukashenko may hope to solve another problem. The Catholic Church in Belarus has traditionally been regarded as a Polish church. Though the situation is changing, around 40% of Catholic priests in Belarus are from Poland (and have Polish citizenship). And while there are no inter-confessional problems on this ground, Catholicism in Belarus widely maintains a Polish identity for those Poles living there, which undermines the country’s ethnic unity. To change the situation, Belarusian authorities hope to put forth an idea of supporting the non-Polish Catholic Church in Belarus at the heart of the Pope’s visit. However, does the Belarusian leadership have the right understanding of the consequences of such a move?
Wait and see
If Aleksandr Lukashenko succeeds in making the Catholic Church in Belarus less associated with the Poles, the Church will become more popular. But contrary to what the Belarusian leadership wants, the “Polish party” will not play a smaller role there. At the moment Poland is implementing its “Polish Card” program for Belarusians, which is very popular in the Western regions. Polish Catholic priests are obtaining Belarusian citizenship. Also, Belarusia sees economic cooperation with Poland as a source of benefit during the crisis and Warsaw as one of the chief operators of the Eastern partnership program. Therefore, the real influence of Warsaw in Belarus will strengthen, though it will take another form.
In the global context, there are signs that the worldwide ecumenical project can be launched very soon. Just to mention Kirill’s pro-ecumenical views, the Urbi et Orbi blessing without the Filioque clause “and the Son” (according to the Orthodox tradition), which the Pope gave last year, as well as positive messages from both sides. However, if the Pope comes to Belarus and meets the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, the reaction of the Orthodox Church would not be as united and positive as it seems to be now. We would, inevitably, see the development of sectarianism and other internal conflicts.
We would see a similar reaction in Belarusian society. Though Aleksandr Lukashenko calls himself an Orthodox atheist, the leadership of the country partly receives its legitimacy from its Orthodoxy. The Belarusian president used to visit all Orthodox Easter services where he talked about the unique role of the Orthodox Church as a stabilizing factor in Belarusian society. This year he was not there. After Lukashenko’s meeting with Benedict XVI, and amidst talks of the possible Pope’s meeting with the Patriarch on Belarusian territory, many Orthodox Belarusians would regard their president’s behaviour as double-dealing. This change in attitude could lead to a very interesting shift in the political landscape, especially at a time of rapprochement with the West. Moreover, the same reaction can be expected from the large number of Orthodox Russians, who traditionally regarded Lukashenko as a defender of traditional values. Is the game worth the candle?
Darya Sologub for RT
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